Inside this Book
If you make use of this material, you may credit the authors as follows:
Olav Lysne, "The Huawei and Snowden Questions: Can Electronic Equipment from Untrusted Vendors be Verified? Can an Untrusted Vendor Build Trust into Electronic Equipment?", Springer Nature, 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74950-1, License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
This book answers two central questions: firstly, is it at all possible to verify electronic equipment procured from untrusted vendors? Secondly, can I build trust into my products in such a way that I support verification by untrusting customers? In separate chapters the book takes readers through the state of the art in fields of computer science that can shed light on these questions. In a concluding chapter it discusses realistic ways forward. In discussions on cyber security, there is a tacit assumption that the manufacturer of equipment will collaborate with the user of the equipment to stop third-party wrongdoers. The Snowden files and recent deliberations on the use of Chinese equipment in the critical infrastructures of western countries have changed this. The discourse in both cases revolves around what malevolent manufacturers can do to harm their own customers, and the importance of the matter is on par with questions of national security. This book is of great interest to ICT and security professionals who need a clear understanding of the two questions posed in the subtitle, and to decision-makers in industry, national bodies and nation states.
Cyber Security, Computer Science, Digital Vulnerability, It Management, Computer Engineering
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